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We predict that access to cross-border financing by the industrial sector reduces firms’ reliance on 
domestic banks, thereby leading to lower rents for banks and greater competition in the domestic 
banking sector. We also predict that banks take on more risk to offset these lost rents and remain 
competitive. Using mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to 
identify variation in cross-border financing, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses. 
Additional tests verify that the effects emanate from the demand-side (i.e., firms not relying on 
banks) rather than the supply-side (i.e., banks not willing to lend to firms). Overall, we document 








We appreciate helpful comments from Mark DeFond (editor), two anonymous referees, Ashiq Ali, Anne Beatty, Andy 
Bernard, Jannis Bischof, Dane Christensen, Dan Collins, Bill Cready, Mark DeFond, Ken French, Andy Leone, DJ 
Nanda, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Shivaram Rajgopal, Bob Resutek, Sugata Roychowdhury, Cathy Schrand, K.R. 
Subramanyam, Xiaoli Tian, Regina Wittenberg-Moerman, Joanna Wu, Jerry Zimmerman and workshop participants 
at Dartmouth (Tuck), Eight New York Fed/NYU Stern Conference on Financial Intermediation, Iowa, Louisiana State, 
Minnesota, Nick Dopuch 2012 Accounting Conference, Ohio State, Miami, Penn State, SUNY Buffalo, UCLA, UC 
San Diego, USC and UT Dallas. 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629499 
 “Fundamental economic forces have improved the availability of information in securities 
markets, making it easier and less costly for business firms to finance their activities by issuing 
securities rather than going to banks…fundamental forces not limited to the United States 
have caused a decline in the profitability of traditional banking throughout the world and 
have created an incentive for banks to expand into new activities and take additional risks” 
Franklin R. Edwards and Frederic S. Mishkin,  




Greater access to cross-border financing expands the investor base, reduces financing 
constraints and improves firm performance (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 2001; Covrig, DeFond 
and Hung 2007). However, the impact of this change in firms’ financing relationships on the 
domestic banking sector has not been explored in depth. We contend that industrial firms’ 
expanded access to overseas financing is a competitive disadvantage to incumbent banks in that it 
forces domestic banks to compete with these alternate suppliers of finance. Our primary hypothesis 
is that the industrial sector’s access to cross-border financing increases competition within the 
domestic banking sector. We document this effect, and also examine domestic banks’ responses 
to the increased competition.1  
Testing our hypothesis is challenging for several reasons. First, we cannot merely regress 
bank competition on a country-level measure of cross-border financing because of endogeneity 
concerns. Second, valid identification requires that our event capture a “demand” shock (i.e., firms 
demanding less bank financing) rather than a “supply” shock (i.e., banks unwilling to lend to 
firms). Third, the event should apply only to some groups, so that the observed outcomes can be 
benchmarked against a control group.  
1 At a conceptual level, our arguments apply to any form of market financing. In other words, access to domestic 
equity (or bond) market financing should also increase bank competition and risk-taking. We focus on cross-border 
financing as it is more closely linked to our setting, which we discuss below.  
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We meet these identification conditions by using the mandatory adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) across several countries in 2005 as our event. This event 
fulfils several requirements to be a valid setting: (i) the adoption of a common set of accounting 
standards increased cross-border financing to the industrial sector (e.g., DeFond et al. 2011; Yu 
and Wahid 2014), (ii) it was adopted by several countries such as Germany and the U.K., but not 
by others such as Japan and the U.S., and (iii) IFRS adoption applied only to publicly listed entities 
which helps contrast the “demand” side from the “supply” side, as explained below.  
IFRS adoption and cross-border financing. Our identifying assumption is that mandatory 
IFRS adoption increased cross-border financing. Using a difference-in-differences design and 
country-level portfolio financing data from the IMF, we find that IFRS adopting countries are 
associated with increased cross-border financing after IFRS adoption to the tune of 10% relative 
to pre-adoption levels. 2  We also verify that there is no difference in cross-border financing 
between adopters and non-adopters in the years leading up to adoption.  
We use differences in cross-border trade across our sample countries as a falsification test. 
In contrast to the cross-border financing results, we are unable to detect any increase in cross-
border trade around IFRS adoption. Our results are robust to controlling for financial market 
development, which helps rule out the possibility that unobserved macroeconomic factors such as 
the overall efficiency and integration of capital and product markets are driving our results. Finally, 
we attempt to mitigate the endogeneity of IFRS adoption by including time-varying controls for 
economic development such as per-capita GDP growth and annual inflation and find that our 
results remain intact.  
2 Our results reinforce the findings in DeFond et al. (2011) and Yu and Wahid (2014) who use foreign mutual fund 
holdings (a specific form of cross-border financing). 
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To reinforce the substitutability between bank financing and cross-border financing, we 
exploit variation in the extent to which IFRS adopters were relying on bank-financing in the pre-
adoption period. Using bank credit extended to the private sector to capture banking-sector reliance 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998), we find that the post-IFRS adoption increase in cross-border financing 
is concentrated in countries with greater reliance on bank financing in the pre-adoption period. In 
particular, cross-border financing increased by 16% in adopting countries with greater banking-
sector reliance, as compared to an insignificant 0.02% in those less reliant on bank financing.3  
Recent studies point to the complementary role of concurrent changes in enforcement that 
accompany IFRS adoption. For example, Daske et al. (2008) and Christensen et al. (2013) note 
that countries within the European Union (EU) stepped up enforcement contemporaneously with 
IFRS adoption (see Barth and Israel, 2013 for a discussion of Christensen et al.). To explore the 
role of concurrent changes in enforcement around IFRS adoption, we split our sample countries 
by EU membership. The effects of IFRS adoption on cross-border financing are stronger within 
the EU, pointing to the role of enforcement. However, we continue to find a statically significant 
(but economically smaller) effect within non-EU IFRS adopters. We interpret these results as 
evidence that enforcement complements but does not subsume the effects of IFRS adoption.  
IFRS adoption and competition within the domestic banking sector. Following Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004), we measure bank 
competition using two measures – a country-level measure of banking sector concentration 
(defined as the share of the five largest banks’ assets in total banking assets), and a bank-level net 
interest margin measure (defined as interest income minus interest expense scaled by total assets).4 
3 Bank financing in these countries was 123% and 51% of GDP respectively in the pre-adoption period. 
4 Although we follow prior work and use banking sector concentration, it is less suited to our setting as it does not 
capture the degree of competition between banks and markets.  
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Consistent with our prediction, we find that IFRS adoption is associated with keener bank 
competition as evidenced by both measures. In particular, banking sector concentration falls by 
4.47 percentage points (i.e., 6% compared to pre-adoption levels) while bank interest margins 
shrink by 25 basis points (a 12% reduction) in adopting as compared to non-adopting countries.  
To document the link between cross-border financing and bank competition, we partition 
our IFRS adopters based on the extent of increase in cross-border financing. We find that the 
observed increases in bank competition are pronounced in IFRS adopters with larger increases in 
cross-border financing between the pre and post adoption periods.  In particular, banks’ net interest 
margins fall by 16% (7%) in countries with above-median (below-median) increases in cross-
border financing.5  
Banks’ response. We conclude by examining banks’ response to the increased competition 
in their product markets. Financial intermediation theories predict that banks increase risk taking 
when competition in their product market intensifies (e.g., Keeley 1990; Besanko and Thakor 
1993, Boot and Greenbaum 1993, Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz 2000). Consistent with theory, 
we find that banks stepped up risk-taking in response to the IFRS-induced changes in their product 
markets. In particular, risk-taking increases by 16% relative to pre-levels in banks domiciled in 
IFRS adopting countries as compared to those in non-adopting countries. To connect these findings 
to the increases in bank competition documented above, we partition IFRS adopters based on 
increases in bank competition between the pre and post adoption periods. We perform two 
partitions – a country-level partition based on the decrease in banking sector concentration, and a 
bank-level partition based on the decrease in net interest margin. In both cases, the increase in bank 
risk-taking is concentrated in banks with above-median increases in bank competition. In 
5 The median increase in cross-border financing is 65%. 
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particular, bank risk-taking increased by 18% in the high competition group. In contrast, risk-
taking decreased by an insignificant 5% in the low competition group.6 
These (inter-connected) results suggest that IFRS adoption enabled firms to access cross-
border financing, which in turn induced greater competition in banks’ domestic product markets, 
which in turn led banks to increase risk-taking to compensate for the lost rents. To further 
document the sequential nature of these findings, we perform a dynamic treatment effect, where 
we decompose the post-IFRS adoption period into the first year after adoption and all subsequent 
years. We find that the increases in cross-border financing and bank competition are evident from 
the first year after adoption. In contrast, the greater risk-taking responses kick in only from the 
second year after adoption.  
Sensitivity tests. We perform a battery of tests to rule out alternative interpretations. First, 
because banks also adopted IFRS, our results might be driven by the “supply” side as opposed to 
the “demand” side. To mitigate this concern, we restrict our examination to private banks (as IFRS 
adoption applied only to publicly listed entities), and find that private banks also depict an increase 
in risk-taking after IFRS adoption. Our data allow us to also control for whether these banks 
voluntarily adopted IFRS, and we find that this is not driving our results. 
Second, our results might be spurious given that mandatory IFRS adoption affected only 
public firms whereas banks generally lend to private firms. To address this concern, we hand-
collect information from Dealscan on German banks’ pre-IFRS lending portfolios and classify 
these banks into two groups – those with high lending concentration in private firms versus those 
with high lending concentration in public firms.7 Our results are concentrated in banks with high 
6   Net interest margins fell by 22% in the former group but rose by 2% in the latter. 
7 We focus on Germany because it has the largest number of banks in our sample and is well-represented in the 
Dealscan database. The non-trivial amount of data-collection precludes an analysis of all countries. 
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lending concentration in public firms. German banks with high lending concentration in private 
firms do not experience any changes in risk-taking after IFRS adoption.  
Third, our inferences are robust to alternative ways of clustering standard errors (see 
discussion in Christensen et al., 2013 and Barth and Israel, 2013). Finally, we verify that our 
inferences are not confounded by the recent financial crisis. Our results are not only robust to 
deleting years that overlap with the crisis, but also do not reveal any differences between adopters 
and non-adopters in the factors identified by Beltratti and Stulz (2012) as contributing to global 
banks’ poor performance during the recent crisis.  
Contributions. Our study makes three contributions. First, we document inter-
connectedness between the industrial sector and the banking sector. The recent financial crisis and 
the ensuing economic slowdown have heightened the importance of better understanding these 
connections. The transmission mechanism in prior work is almost always from the banking sector 
to the industrial sector.  In contrast, we present evidence of effects working in the reverse direction, 
i.e., from the industrial sector to the banking sector. In the process, our analysis broadens the 
economic consequences of IFRS adoption beyond the previously documented financing benefits 
to firms. We show that IFRS adoption also affected the banking sector and promoted risk-taking.   
Second, we document how competition from financial markets affects the domestic 
banking sector. While several studies examine how banks compete with each another and the 
economic consequences of bank competition (e.g., Keeley, 1980), our study introduces a novel 
dimension by positing financial markets as a source of competition to domestic banks.  
Finally, our results suggest that while financial reforms such as market liberalization offer 
financing benefits to firms, they impose costs on domestic banks by reducing their lending rents 
and inducing them to take on more risk. The overall desirability of these financial reforms involves 
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a delicate tradeoff between imposing costs on the banking sector and rendering benefits to the 
industrial sector – a fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
2. MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Cross-border financing and competition in the banking sector 
The benefits of cross-border financing to industrial firms have been well documented. For 
example, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) show that equity market liberalizations that give 
foreign investors the opportunity to invest in domestic equity securities increase economic growth. 
These effects are attributed to improved risk-sharing and lower financial constraints – both of 
which lead to increased investment. Similar effects are documented in the “home-bias” literature 
(e.g., Lau, Ng and Zhang, 2010). 
The enhanced access to capital, while a benefit to borrowing firms, is a significant cost to 
banks. Prior to the inflow of cross-border financing, firms relied on banks to meet their financing 
needs, resulting in bank enjoying rents in the lending market. By expanding borrowing firms’ 
expanded access to foreign capital markets, cross-border financing forces banks to compete more 
fiercely with the additional purveyors of financing. In contrast to the large literature that documents 
the financing benefits of cross-border financing to the industrial sector, the effect of this financing 
on the banking sector has been relatively unexplored. We predict that cross-border financing by 
the industrial sector increases competition in the domestic banking sector.  
 
2.2 Banks’ response to the increased competition 
We examine banks’ reaction to the (hypothesized) increase in their product market 
competition. The “charter-value” hypothesis predicts that banks increase risk-taking when 
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competition intensifies in their product markets (Keeley 1990, Besanko and Thakor 1993, Boot 
and Greenbaum 1993, Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz 2000). The idea is that banks trade-off the 
benefits of risk-taking (i.e., more profits) with the costs of doing so (i.e., inability to enjoy future 
rents due to bank failure). Competition reduces the stream of future profits (known as the “charter 
value”) and thus diminishes the marginal cost of bank failure. Analytical models of bank 
competition also predict that banks would increase risk-taking (see Besanko and Thakor 1993) and 
Boot and Greenbaum 1993). The idea is that banks, in the course of relationship-lending, acquire 
private information that generates informational rents. As long as banks can appropriate these 
rents, they have an incentive to limit their risk exposure so as to preserve the value of the 
relationship. However, once the industry becomes more competitive, the value of relationship 
banking decreases and banks respond by taking on more risk (see also Boot and Thakor 2000). 
Keeley (1990) offers evidence consistent with the charter-value hypothesis.  He examines 
how increased competition in the banking industry brought about by the easing of banking 
restrictions influences bank risk-taking. He finds that an increase in bank competition reduces 
banks’ franchise values and that banks respond by taking on more risk. Based on the above studies, 
we expect the greater bank competition brought about by cross-border financing in the industrial 
sector to increase risk-taking by banks.  
We combine the above two predictions into one hypothesis (stated in the alternative) as 
follows: 
H1: Cross-border financing in the industrial sector increases bank competition and 






3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
In this section, we describe the empirical proxies, motivate our control variables, present 
our regression specifications, and describe the sample. Our empirical strategy involves the 
following steps. First, we validate that our instrument (IFRS adoption) does indeed increase cross-
border financing. Second, we document increases in bank competition after IFRS adoption, and 
show that these increases are pronounced for countries with greater increases in cross-border 
financing after IFRS adoption. Third, we document increases in bank risk-taking after IFRS 
adoption, and provide evidence that these increases are stronger in banks (and countries) that depict 
larger increases in bank competition after IFRS adoption. Finally, we perform several sensitivity 
tests to rule out alternative explanations. 
 
3.1 IFRS adoption as the instrument for cross-border financing 
We use the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 
several countries in 2005 (and Singapore in 2003) as source of identifying variation in cross-border 
financing. Prior studies find that IFRS adoption increased cross-border financing (e.g., DeFond et 
al., 2011; Yu and Wahid, 2014). Another advantage of this setting is that not all countries adopted 
IFRS, thereby providing us with a control group against which to benchmark the effects that we 
observe in the adopting countries. 
We obtain data on countries that adopted IFRS from the sources in Daske et al. (2008, pp. 
1100-1102). We define two indicators – IFRS to denote adopters vs. non-adopters and POST to 
denote the pre vs. post periods. POST takes the value of 0 for the four years before IFRS adoption 
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and 1 for the five years after adoption. 8 We exclude the year of adoption, which is 2005 for all 
countries except Singapore, which adopted IFRS in 2003.  
 
3.2 Primary outcome variables 
3.2.1 Cross-border financing (CBFIN) 
We measure cross-border financing as the extent of foreign portfolio investment made in 
the country scaled by total GDP. We use this measure as it represents cross-border transactions 
and positions involving both debt and equity securities, other than those included in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).9 
 
3.2.2 Cross-border trade (CBTRADE) 
We use cross-border trade (CBTRADE) defined as the sum of imports and exports scaled 
by GDP as a falsification test. We expect no change in CBTRADE around IFRS adoption. 
 
3.2.3 Domestic equity market capitalization (EQMKTCAP) 
To ensure that our results are not on account of overall improvements in financial markets, 
we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and use the ratio of domestic equity market capitalization 
scaled by annual GDP as the proxy for financial market development. In addition, we include stock 
market turnover (TURNOVER) defined as the ratio of total shares traded to total shares outstanding 
as an additional control for macroeconomic factors influencing the domestic equity market. 
8 We use four years of pre period data because annual cross-border financing data (from the IMF) start from 2001. 
Prior to that, data are available only for 1997. Thus, Singapore has only two years of pre-period data. Our results are 
robust to excluding Singapore and also to using alternative event windows such as three years before and after adoption 
and four years rather than five years after adoption.  
9 FDI, on the other hand, represents cross border investments that afford the lender control or a significant degree of 
influence over the borrower (based on a cutoff of 10% of the voting power). 
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3.2.4 Bank competition  
Competition is a difficult construct to capture empirically. We use two measures commonly 
used in prior studies (e.g., Barth, Caprio and Levine 2004, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine 
2004): an income-based measure defined at the bank-level and an asset-based measure defined at 
the country-level. Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2004) find that both measures are positively correlated.  
We use net interest margin (NIM) as the income-based, bank-level measure and define it 
as the excess of the bank’s interest income over interest expense scaled by total assets. Higher 
values of NIM indicate a less competitive banking sector.  We define banking sector concentration 
(CONC) as our asset-based, country-level measure and compute it as the fraction of total banking 
sector assets held by the five largest banks in the country. Higher values of CONC denote a more 
concentrated (i.e., less competitive) banking sector.10   
 
3.2.5 Bank risk-taking (RISK) 
Following Laeven and Levine (2009), we use the distance-to-default ratio as the inverse 
measure of bank risk-taking (RISK). It is defined as return on assets plus the capital asset ratio 
divided by the standard deviation of asset returns.11 This measure captures the distance from 
insolvency (Roy, 1952), where insolvency is said to occur when losses exceed bank equity. Thus, 
lower values of RISK signal greater bank risk-taking.  
 
3.3 Control variables 
Since cross-border financing (CBFIN) and bank asset concentration (CONC) are defined 
at the country-level while the net interest margin (NIM) and bank risk-taking (RISK) at the bank-
10 Although this measure is commonly used to measure bank competition, it is not ideal for our setting because it does 
not capture the extent of competition between banks and markets. 
11 Our results are robust to using return on equity instead of return on assets. 
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level, we use both a country-level panel as well as a bank-level panel in our tests. We estimate our 
empirical specifications with country fixed effects which fully control for any cross-country, time-
invariant heterogeneity and year fixed effects that capture overall time-trends during our sample 
period. The country fixed-effects obviate the need to include country-level controls such as the 
level of investor protection, structure of the banking sector, differences in bank regulation etc. We 
also use bank fixed-effects in some of our bank-level specifications (which we discuss in detail 
later on). We cluster our robust standard errors by bank.12 
In addition, we include time-varying controls for economic development to mitigate the 
endogeneity of IFRS adoption (i.e., the decision to adopt IFRS could be correlated with the 
country’s level of economic development). The variables we include are the level of GDP (GDP), 
annual growth in GDP (GDPGROWTH), and annual inflation (INFL). We also include domestic 
equity market cap (EQMKTCAP) and stock turnover (TURNOVER) to control for domestic 
financial market development. Finally, we include cross-border trade (TRADE) to control for any 
differences in global integration between IFRS adopters and non-adopters during our sample 
period. The concern with including these variables is that they might be affected by IFRS adoption 
and thus might be endogenous (see Gormley and Matsa, 2011 for a discussion).  
In the bank-level panel, we follow Laeven and Levine (2007, 2009) and include an array 
of bank-level controls to complement the country-level controls. We include bank growth 
(GROWTH), defined as the annual growth in revenues, total assets of the bank (LNASSETS) to 
control for bank size, liquidity (LIQUID) defined as the proportion of liquid assets to liquid 
12 While clustering by bank is more lenient than clustering by country, we use the former to mitigate the concern that 
our cross-sectional inferences might be due to the more severe clustering. We explain this in greater detail when we 
discuss the cross-sectional tests. In addition, we tabulate results (both country-level and bank-level) using country-
level clustering and find robust results (except for bank concentration).  
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liabilities, the ratio of loans to total assets (LOANS) to capture asset composition, whether the bank 
is public or private (LISTED) 13 and the bank’s market share of deposits (MKTSHARE). 
 
3.4 Regression specifications 
3.4.1 Effect of IFRS adoption on cross-border financing (CBFIN) 
To examine the effect of IFRS adoption on cross-border financing (CBFIN), we estimate 
the following country-level, difference-in-differences specification: 
α λ β β β β
β β β ε
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                     (1) 
where ,j tCBFIN  is cross-border financing measured for country j at time t; α j  and λt  represent 
country and year fixed effects respectively. The coefficient on IFRS*POST in eq. (1) identifies the 
incremental changes in CBFIN after adoption for adopters as compared to non-adopters. Since eq. 
(1) includes country fixed effects, the coefficient on IFRS gets subsumed and is not identified. 
Similarly, the year fixed effects subsume POST. Our hypothesis predicts β >1 0 . 
 
3.4.2 Banking-sector reliance and the effect of IFRS adoption on cross-border financing 
We explore how banking sector reliance influences the effect of IFRS adoption on cross-
border financing. In particular, we expect the effects of IFRS adoption to be more pronounced in 
countries that were more reliant on bank financing in the pre-adoption period. To test this 
prediction, we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and use the total amount of bank lending to the 
private sector (BNK_REL) as our proxy for banking sector reliance.14 We split our IFRS adopters 
13 Following Laeven and Levine (2007), we use the “Listed” indicator to identify public vs. private banks. 
14 We use a this country measure rather than a firm-level measure because of two data constraints – (i) a detailed 
mapping between each bank in our sample and each firm that it lends to is not available, and (ii) a breakdown of each 
firm’s indebtedness into bank debt versus public debt is also not available. 
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into two groups (IFRS_BNK_REL_HI and IFRS_BNK_REL_LO) depending on whether they were 
more versus less reliant on bank financing in the pre-period (based on the median). We interact 
each of these indicators with POST to separate the effects of IFRS adoption for each group. The 
regression specification is as follows: 
α λ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ ε
= + +
+ + + +
+ + +
+, 1 , 2 ,
3 4 5 6
7 8
, , , ,
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      (2) 
We expect δ δ>1 2 . 
 
3.4.3 Effect of IFRS adoption on bank concentration (CONC) 
We estimate the following model to gauge how IFRS adoption affects bank concentration: 
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Our hypothesis predicts χ <1 0 . 
 
3.4.4 Effect of IFRS adoption on banks’ net interest margin (NIM) 
The effect of IFRS adoption on banks’ net interest margin is estimated using a bank-level 
panel as follows: 
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where , ,i j tNIM  is the net interest margin measured for bank i in country j at time t. Our 




3.4.5 Cross-border financing and the effects of IFRS adoption on bank competition 
To tie the post-adoption increases in bank competition to cross-border financing, we split 
our IFRS adopters into two groups based on changes in cross-border financing between the pre 
and post adoption periods – IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI and IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO  where HI (LO) denotes 
above (below) median changes. We expect increases in bank competition to be pronounced in 
IFRS countries with above median changes in cross-border financing. In other words, we expect 
θ θ>1 2  and ρ ρ>1 2 in the following specifications: 
α λ θ θ
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3.4.6 Effect of IFRS adoption on bank risk-taking (RISK) 
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Our hypothesis predictsω <1 0 . 
 
3.4.7 Bank competition and the effect of IFRS adoption on bank risk-taking  
We expect increases in bank risk-taking to be more pronounced in countries (banks) with 
steeper decreases in bank concentration (net interest margin). To test this prediction, we split our 
IFRS adopting banks along two dimensions – (i) at the country-level based on changes in bank 
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concentration between the pre and post periods (IFRS_∆CONC_HI and IFRS_∆CONC_LO), and 
(ii) at the bank-level based on changes in net interest margin (IFRS_∆NIM_HI and 
IFRS_∆NIM_LO). We include bank fixed-effects in the latter case as identification comes from 
bank-level variation. Increases in risk-taking are expected to be more pronounced in the 
IFRS_∆CONC_LO and IFRS_∆NIM_LO groups, i.e., we expect π π>1 2  and φ φ>1 2 . The 
specifications are: 
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3.5 Sample 
Our data are from four sources. Cross-border financing (CBFIN) data are obtained from 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF. Domestic market cap 
(EQMKTCAP), stock turnover (TURNOVER), cross-border trade (CBTRADE), bank concentration 
(CONC), bank financing (BNKFIN), GDP and inflation data are from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. The bank-level outcome variables (net-interest 
margin (NIM), bank risk-taking (RISK)) and controls are estimated from Bankscope, a Bureau van 
Dijk database on international banks. Finally, IFRS adoption dates are from Daske et al. (2008).  
Table 1 presents the list of IFRS adopters and non-adopters. Twenty-six countries spread 
across Europe and Asia adopted IFRS while twenty-four countries in the same regions do not. The 
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list of adopters comprises all EU countries such as Germany, France, and the U.K. and also others 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines. Notable non-adopters are Japan, the U.S. and 
Brazil. Our final sample comprises 59,164 bank-year observations and ranges from 12,523 
observations from Germany to 79 from Bermuda.15  
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the country-level variables while Panel 
B tabulates the bank-level variables. The mean cross-border financing (CBFIN) is 2.126 which 
corresponds to 212.6% of GDP. The median is more modest at 0.449 (44.9% of GDP) indicating 
a right-skewed distribution. We therefore use log-transformed values in the multivariate 
regressions. The mean domestic market cap (EQMKTCAP) is 0.793 which corresponds to 79.3% 
of GDP, while average cross-border trade (CBTRADE) is 0.704 or 70.4% of GDP. The mean value 
of bank concentration (CONC) is 68.988, which suggests that around 69% of the total banking 
assets in the country are concentrated in the top 5 banks. There is wide variation in this measure 
across the sample countries with a minimum value of 28.012% and a maximum of 100%.  
Turning to the bank-level variables, the net interest margin (NIM) of the average bank in 
the sample is 2.104% with the highest spread being 8.39% and the lowest being -1.15%. The mean 
value of bank risk-taking (RISK) is 3.617 which means that profits in this bank can fall by 36 
standard deviations (e3.617-1) before bank profits and equity are wiped out. 
Overall, the sample depicts rich heterogeneity with respect to both country-level variables 
as well as bank-level factors. 
 
15 We exclude U.S. banks from the bank-level tests to mitigate the influence of data coverage on our inferences. In 
particular, coverage of U.S. banks in Bankscope varies greatly over time. For example, the number of U.S. banks 
covered goes up from 1,200 in 1998 to 5,170 in 2000 to 6,900 in 2003. In contrast, coverage for other countries is 
fairly stable. For example, Bankscope covers 48 Canadian banks in 1998, 49 in 2000 and 52 in 2003. Similarly, it 
covers 1,690 banks in Germany in 1998, 1,631 in 2000 and 1,438 in 2003. The WDI database, in contrast, does not 
depict such trends in data coverage. 
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4 RESULTS 
4.1 IFRS adoption and cross-border financing  
4.1.1 Univariate evidence 
We begin our empirical analyses by validating our identification assumption that 
mandatory IFRS adoption increased cross-border financing.  
Figure 1 presents graphical evidence. The horizontal axis represents the years relative to 
IFRS adoption, while the vertical axis in Panel A plots the average values of (the log of) cross-
border financing (CBFIN) that correspond to these periods. Two clear patterns emerge. First, IFRS 
adopters and non-adopters exhibit a similar trend in the pre-IFRS adoption period. This provides 
validity of the parallel-trends assumption of diff-in-diff designs, i.e., the treatment and control 
groups appear to be similar prior to the event. Second, while non-adopters continue along their 
trend, adopters depict a noticeable increase in cross-border financing in the post-IFRS adoption 
period. Reassuringly, these effects show up in the year immediately after IFRS adoption. 
 Panel B plots the average values of cross-border trade (CBTRADE) around IFRS adoption. 
In contrast to the cross-border financing results, there does not appear to be any discontinuity in 
cross-border trade around IFRS adoption for either adopters or non-adopters. We interpret these 
patterns as suggestive evidence that IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in cross-border 
financing, but not cross-border trade. 
 
4.1.2 Multivariate evidence 
Table 3 presents the multivariate regression results of eq. (1). Models (1) and (2) pertain to 
cross-border financing (CBFIN), and models (3) and (4) to cross-border trade (CBTRADE). The 
first model in each case presents results without the year fixed effects, while the second model 
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includes year fixed effects. Consistent with the graphical evidence, the coefficient on IFRS*POST 
is positive and significant in Models (1) and (2) where CBFIN is the dependent variable. The 
coefficient on IFRS*POST of 0.099 in Model (2) corresponds to a 10% increase (e0.08-1) in cross-
border financing for IFRS adopters that is incremental to that for non-adopters.  
The next set of results indicate that the above increases in cross-border financing do not 
extend to cross-border trade. In particular, the coefficient on IFRS*POST is insignificant in the 
CBTRADE specification indicating no incremental change in cross-border trade for IFRS adopters 
as compared to non-adopters. These results reduce the likelihood that our results are driven by the 
increasing globalization of product markets. 
 
4.1.3 Parallel trends and other sensitivity tests 
Because IFRS adoption was not random and that countries chose to adopt these standards, 
it could be that more cross-border financing in adopting countries is what led them to adopt these 
standards in the first place (i.e., reverse causality). A related concern is that we might be merely 
picking up ongoing time-trends that started before IFRS adoption. Or perhaps unobservable 
macroeconomic changes are the true drivers of both IFRS adoption and greater cross-border 
financing (the omitted variable concern). 
The reverse causality and time-trend arguments make a common prediction – one should 
observe increased cross-border financing in adopting countries in the years leading up to IFRS 
adoption. To investigate this possibility, we follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and examine 
the dynamic effects of IFRS adoption. In particular, we create additional indicator variables to 
denote the two years immediately preceding IFRS adoption (POST_-2 and POST_-1) and interact 
these with IFRS. The reverse causality and time trend interpretations predict significant 
19 
 
coefficients on IFRS*POST_-2 and IFRS*POST_-1. Model (1) of Table 4 presents these dynamic 
treatment effects. The coefficients on IFRS*POST_-2 and IFRS*POST_-1 are both insignificant, 
providing no support for the reverse causality or time-trend interpretations. The coefficient on 
IFRS*POST however remains positive and significant.  
The sharpness of the results around IFRS adoption helps alleviate concerns that the effects 
might be due to unobservable macroeconomic changes correlated with IFRS adoption. However, 
to further address this concern, we include the level and growth in GDP (GDP and GDPGROWTH) 
and annual inflation (INFL) as time-varying controls for changes in economic development that 
might be correlated with the decision to adopt IFRS. These results, in Model (2), indicate that our 
inferences remain unchanged. The coefficient on IFRS*POST remains positive and significant 
while those on IFRS*POST_-2 and IFRS*POST_-1 remain insignificant. Finally, we also control 
for domestic market cap (EQMKTCAP), stock market turnover (TURNOVER) and cross-border 
trade (CBTRADE) as a “catch-all” for changes in domestic market development and global 
integration of markets. Our results in Model (3) continue to depict a positive and significant 
coefficient on IFRS*POST, indicating that our inferences are likely driven by IFRS adoption and 
not by other unobservable factors. 
 
4.1.4 Role of banking sector reliance 
Table 5, Panel A presents results of how banking sector reliance (in the pre-period) 
influences the effect of IFRS adoption on cross-border financing. Consistent with our prediction 
in eq. (2), we find that the coefficient on IFRS_BNK_REL_HI*POST is larger in magnitude (0.151) 
than that on IFRS_BNK_REL_LO*POST (-0.002). These differences are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. In fact, post-IFRS adoption increases in cross-border financing are concentrated in 
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countries with a greater reliance on the banking sector in the pre-adoption period. These countries 
experience a 16% increase in cross-border financing between the pre and post adoption periods.16 
There is no increase in cross-border financing in IFRS countries less reliant on bank financing.17  
 
4.1.5 Role of enforcement 
A recent study by Christensen et al. (2013) posits that it might be premature to attribute 
economic consequences around IFRS adoption to the accounting rules alone. They note that 
several countries that adopted IFRS also made contemporaneous changes to enforcement and that 
care needs to be exercised to determine the true cause of the documented effects. To drive home 
their point, they split IFRS adopters into those in the European Union (EU) versus those outside 
and show that increases in stock liquidity are concentrated in the former group. This, they argue, 
shows that IFRS adoption alone is insufficient to generate increases in borrower transparency (see 
Barth and Israel, 2013 for a counter-argument). While this debate is far from settled, we perform 
similar tests to better understand the influence of enforcement on our results.  
In particular, we split our sample into countries within the EU and those outside, and 
estimate eq. (1) within each subsample.18 Consistent with Christensen et al. (2013), we find in 
Panel B of Table 5 that the effect of IFRS adoption is stronger within the EU. In particular, the 
coefficient on IFRS*POST in the EU subsample is statistically significant and economically larger 
(0.419) than that in the non-EU subsample (0.081). Further, the latter coefficient is also statistically 
significant, indicating that non-EU adopters are also associated with an increase in cross-border 
16 The average pre-period bank financing in this group was to the tune of 123% of GDP. 
17 The average bank financing in this group was 51% of GDP. 
18 We use the split-sample design rather than splitting our IFRS indicator into EU and non-EU groups because we 
already split it along the bank financing dimension. However, decomposing the IFRS indicator into four groups 
provides similar inferences. 
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financing. When we split the IFRS indicator based on banking sector reliance, we find that the 
increases in cross-border financing for IFRS adopters in both subsamples is concentrated in 
countries with greater banking sector reliance in the pre-period. In other words, only the coefficient 
on IFRS_BNK_REL_HI*POST is positive and significant in both the EU and non-EU subsamples, 
while that on IFRS_BNK_REL_LO*POST is insignificant. Further, consistent with the 
complementary effect of enforcement, the coefficient on IFRS_BNK_REL_HI*POST is larger in 
magnitude in the EU subsample (0.299) as compared to the non-EU subsample (0.129) with these 
differences being statistically significant at the 5% level.  
We summarize these results as evidence that enforcement complements but does not 
subsume the effects of IFRS adoption.  
 
4.2 IFRS adoption and bank competition  
4.2.1 Overall effects and the role of cross-border financing 
We now turn to the effect of IFRS adoption on bank competition. Results of eq.’s (3) and 
(4) are presented in Table 6. Models (1) and (2) are based on banking sector concentration (CONC) 
and employ a country-level panel, while Models (2) and (3) present the net interest margin (NIM) 
results and are based on a bank-level panel. 
Consistent with hypothesis H1, we find that IFRS adoption is associated with greater bank 
competition, as evidenced by both measures. In particular, the coefficient on IFRS*POST is 
negative (-4.469) and significant at the 1% level in Model (1) where CONC is the dependent 
variable. This drop in bank concentration of 4.469 corresponds to a decrease of 6% compared to 
pre-adoption levels (given a pre-period mean CONC of 73.12 for IFRS adopters). Similarly, the 
coefficient on IFRS*POST is negative (-0.247) and significant at the 1% level in Model (3) where 
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NIM is the dependent variable. This 25 basis points drop in the net interest margin corresponds to 
a 12% decrease in lending margins (given a pre-period mean NIM of 2.033 for IFRS adopters). 
While the above results speak to the overall effects of IFRS adoption, they do not illustrate 
the link between the increases in cross-border financing and greater bank competition. 19  To 
examine this link, we split the IFRS indicator into IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI and IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO 
based on above versus below median increases in cross-border financing, and compare the 
increases in bank competition between these two groups. These results based on eq.’s (5) and (6) 
are presented in Models (2) and (4) respectively of Table 6. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the increases in bank competition are more 
pronounced in IFRS adopting countries that experienced larger (i.e., above median) increases in 
cross-border financing between the pre and post adoption periods. In particular, the coefficient on 
IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI*POST is more negative (-6.212 and -0.312) than that on 
IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO*POST (-2.475 and -0.153) in both the bank concentration (CONC) and net 
interest margin (NIM) specifications. Further, these differences are statistically significant at the 
10% and 5% levels respectively.  
In terms of economic significance, countries in the IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI group encountered 
an 8% decrease in banking sector concentration and a 16% decrease in net interest margin. In 
contrast, countries in the IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO group faced a (statistically insignificant) 3% decrease 




19 We thank the referees for these suggestions. 
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4.3 IFRS adoption and bank risk-taking  
4.3.1 Overall effects and the role of bank competition 
Table 7 tabulates results of banks’ risk-taking responses to the higher competition in their 
product markets. Model (1) presents results of eq. (7) where we regress the bank-level measure of 
risk-taking (RISK) on IFRS*POST and include bank-level and country-level controls. Since RISK 
is an inverse measure of risk-taking, Hypothesis H1 predicts a negative coefficient on IFRS*POST. 
That is precisely what we uncover in Model (1). The coefficient on IFRS*POST is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating higher risk-taking after IFRS adoption. The value of -0.171 
on IFRS*POST corresponds to a 16% increase (e-0.171-1) in bank risk-taking. Thus, banks appear 
to resort to greater risk-taking after IFRS adoption, as predicted. 
While the above results are suggestive of bank competition affecting risk-taking, we 
reinforce this link using cross-sectional splits. In particular, we split our IFRS indicator along two 
dimensions based on: increases in bank concentration defined at the country-level 
(IFRS_∆CONC_HI and IFRS_∆CONC_LO), and changes in net interest margin at the bank-level 
(IFRS_∆NIM_HI and IFRS_∆NIM_LO). These are represented by eq.’s (8) and (9).  
Since steeper decreases in CONC and NIM denote keener bank competition, we expect the 
effect of IFRS adoption on risk-taking to be pronounced in the IFRS_∆CONC_LO and 
IFRS_∆NIM_LO groups. Models (2) and (3) present results of these tests. Consistent with our 
expectation, the coefficient on IFRS_∆CONC_LO*POST is more negative (-0.221) than that on 
IFRS_∆CONC_HI*POST (-0.103), with this difference being statistically significant at the 5% 
level. In fact, the latter coefficient is insignificant from zero indicating no evidence of higher risk-
taking in banks with above median changes in banking sector concentration between the pre and 
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post IFRS periods. The higher risk-taking is concentrated in banks with below median increases 
in banking sector concentration.  
Similar inferences extend to the bank-level split based on net interest margins. While the 
coefficient on IFRS_∆NIM_LO*POST is negative (-0.193) and significant at the 5% level, that on 
IFRS_∆NIM_HI*POST is positive (0.051) and insignificant. Further, these coefficients are 
statistically different from each other at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, bank risk-
taking increased by 18% in IFRS_∆NIM_LO banks. In contrast, bank risk-taking decreased by an 
insignificant 5% in IFRS_∆NIM_HI  banks. Overall, these results indicate that banks responded to 
the keener competition in their product markets by taking on more risk.  
 
4.4 Honing in on the linkages between the mechanisms  
Our cross-sectional tests suggest that IFRS-induced increases in cross-border financing are 
associated with greater competition in banks’ product markets, which in turn encouraged banks to 
take on more risk. In this section, we perform an additional test to show that these changes are 
sequential. In particular, we decompose the POST indicator into the year immediately succeeding 
the year of adoption (POST_1) and all other years (POST_2+). This allows us to examine when 
each of our outcomes kick in. In particular, we regress cross-border financing (CBFIN), net interest 
margin (NIM) and bank risk-taking (RISK) on IFRS*POST_1 and IFRS*POST_2+. We do not 
make any ex ante predictions, as the intent here is to try and glean evidence on the sequential 
nature of these effects. 
Table 8 presents the results. We find that the coefficients on IFRS*POST_1 and 
IFRS*POST_2+ are both positive and significant and of similar magnitude in the CBFIN 
specification of Model (1). This indicates that post-IFRS increases in cross-border financing kick 
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in immediately from the year succeeding adoption. A similar result comes through for net interest 
margin (NIM), where the coefficients on IFRS*POST_1 and IFRS*POST_2+ are both negative 
and significant and again of similar magnitude in Model (2). These results indicate that the 
increases in cross-border financing and bank competition kick in immediately. In contrast, the 
coefficient on IFRS*POST_1 in the RISK specification of Model (3) is positive and insignificant 
while that on IFRS*POST_2+ is negative and significant, indicating that the observed increases in 
bank risk-taking take an additional year to kick in. We interpret these results as reinforcing the 
sequential nature of these underlying mechanisms. 
 
4.5 Sensitivity tests 
4.5.1 Isolating demand effects from supply effects 
To address the concern that bank adoption of IFRS could be driving our results, we restrict 
our bank-panel to private banks. Since IFRS adoption was mandated for publicly traded firms (and 
banks), evidence of increased risk-taking in private banks would rule out the possibility that our 
results are driven by supply-side effects of IFRS adoption by banks. Further, our data allow us to 
control for whether the bank chose to voluntarily adopt IFRS or retained its local GAAP (which 
we denote by an indicator ACCTSTD).  
Table 9, Panel A presents these results, where Models (1) and (2) pertain to NIM and 
Models (3) and (4) to RISK. The first specification in each case excludes ACCTSTD while the 
second includes it. Consistent with our prior results, the coefficient on IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI*POST 
remains negative and significant in both the NIM specifications, while IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO*POST 
remains insignificant. These coefficients are significantly different from each other at the 5% level 
in both cases.  
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Similar inferences extend to the risk-taking (RISK) results. The coefficient on 
IFRS_∆CONC_LO*POST remains negative and significant in both specifications, while 
IFRS_∆CONC_HI*POST continues to be insignificant. Here again, the two coefficients are 
significantly different at the 5% level (in model (3)) and at the 10% level (in model (4)). Overall, 
we conclude that our results are unlikely to be confounded by banks adopting IFRS. 
 
4.5.2 Public firms versus private firms 
One limitation of our setting is that IFRS adoption applied only to public firms whereas 
our sample banks could have been lending primarily to private firms. It is difficult to address this 
concern within our sample as neither IMF nor Bankscope provides detailed borrower-level 
breakdown of banks’ lending portfolios. To circumvent this obstacle, we turn to Dealscan that 
provides data on the international syndicated loan market. A syndicated loan is extended jointly 
by a group of banks, including one or sometimes a couple of lead banks and several participant 
banks (see Giannetti and Laeven, 2012 for a detailed discussion).  The advantage of Dealscan is 
that it provides data on the listing status of borrowers (i.e., public versus private firms) and also 
on which banks these firms borrow from. The disadvantage, of course, is that it covers only a select 
set of firms and banks within each country. 
Since there is no common identifier linking Dealscan with Bankscope, we manually match 
the common banks using bank names and therefore conduct this exercise only for Germany – one 
of the largest countries in our sample and well-represented on Dealscan. To ensure that we are 
capturing variation in listing status across firms and not across banks, we restrict our sample to 
private banks. Our hand-collection gives us a final sample of 252 observations. As our sample is 
restricted to a single country, we exclude the country-level controls. Further, the effect of IFRS 
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adoption is now captured by POST (and not IFRS*POST). We split this POST variable into two – 
POST_PVT to denote banks that lend to private firms and POST_PUB to denote those that lend to 
public firms. In particular, POST_PVT (POST_PUB) takes the value of 1 if the bank has an above 
median concentration of lending to private (public) firms in the pre-IFRS adoption period as 
computed based on Dealscan. 
Table 9, Panel B presents the results. The coefficient on POST in Model (1) is negative but 
insignificant indicating no evidence of higher risk-taking in the entire sample. However, when we 
distinguish between banks based on the listing status of their borrowers, the results are stark. The 
coefficient on POST_PVT is positive and insignificant (0.177 and p-value of 0.431) while that on 
POST_PUB is negative and significant (-0.564 and p-value of 0.034). These results indicate no 
change in risk-taking around IFRS adoption for banks that lent to private firms in the pre-IFRS 
period but a strong increase for banks that lent to public firms.  
Overall, these results provide a validity check that our results stem from banks that lent to 
public firms rather than those that lent to private firms (the former being the ones impacted by 
IFRS adoption).  
 
4.5.3 Country-level clustering of standard errors 
We cluster the standard errors in our tests by bank which is admittedly more lenient than 
clustering by country. We do so to mitigate concerns that our cross-sectional inferences might be 
due to the more severe clustering. For example, we show that the increase in bank risk-taking after 
IFRS adoption is statistically significant in countries which experienced above-median increases 
in banking sector competition, and that countries with below-median increases in banking sector 
competition experience no significant increase in risk-taking. We cluster our standard errors by 
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bank rather than by country to mitigate the concern that the latter (non-)result might be due to the 
more stringent country-level clustering. We tabulate all our results (both country-level and bank-
level) using country-level clustering in this section. These results are presented in Table 9, Panel 
C and indicate a significant coefficient on IFRS*POST in the cross-border financing (CBFIN), net 
interest margin (NIM) and bank risk-taking (RISK) regressions. The only exception is banking 
sector concentration, where IFRS*POST is negative but insignificant at conventional levels. 
However, even in this case, there is a statically significant decrease in bank concentration (not 
tabulated) for countries with greater increases in cross-border financing (i.e., the coefficient on 
IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI*POST is negative and significant at the 10% level).20 Overall, we interpret 
these results as evidence that our results are robust to clustering standard errors more stringently. 
 
4.5.4 Are the results driven by the recent financial crisis? 
Given the proximity of the IFRS adoption date to the recent financial crisis, we examine 
whether our results are driven by the crisis. In this case, the crisis should have affected IFRS 
adopters differentially than non-adopters. This is because, any overall effects of the crisis would 
be subsumed by the year fixed effects and would therefore not bias the coefficient on IFRS*POST. 
To explore whether the crisis affected adopters differently from non-adopters, we perform two 
tests – first, we exclude 2008 from our sample as it overlaps with the crisis period and find 
consistent results. Second, we follow Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and look for differences across 
adopters and non-adopters in factors that contributed to global banks’ poor performance during the 
recent crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that certain features of banks’ asset and liability 
structures could have predicted their performance during the crisis. On the liability side, banks that 
20 As noted previously, the weaker results are likely because the asset–based concentration measure does not capture 
competition that banks face from other sources of financing such as capital markets. 
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were highly levered had greater reliance on short-term capital market funding and those with fewer 
deposits performed worse. On the asset side, banks from countries with greater restrictions on bank 
activities fared better. 
We examine pre-crisis (i.e., year 2006) differences in bank leverage (LEV), deposit ratio 
(DEPOSITS), tier 1 capital ratio (TIER1) and funding fragility (FUND_FRAG), defined following 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) as the ratio of money market funding and inter-bank deposits to total 
funding. These results are presented in Figure 2 and Table 9, Panel D. 
Turning to the graphical evidence, there is no difference in any of the crisis factors between 
IFRS adopters and non-adopters. This is confirmed by Table 9, Panel D which presents differences 
in means and medians of the contributing factors across IFRS adopters and non-adopters. As can 
be seen, adopters and non-adopters do not differ (either economically or statistically) across any 
of the critical factors that contributed to banks’ poor performance during the crisis. These results 
suggest that the crisis did not contribute to the effects that we attribute to IFRS adoption. However, 
given the complexity of the recent crisis and the various facets of the banking and industrial sectors 
that it affected, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
Using mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as 
identifying variation in cross-border financing, we provide evidence of a link from the industrial 
sector to the banking sector. We posit and document that cross-border financing by industrial firms 
induces greater competition between banks and these alternative financing sources. We show that 
banks respond to higher competition in their product markets by resorting to more risk-taking.  
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In addition to documenting real effects of IFRS adoption on the banking sector, our study 
provides novel evidence of transmission mechanisms that emanate from the industrial sector and 
transmit to the banking sector. The implications of these findings for bank stability and other 
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Table 1: List of adopting and non-adopting countries 
 
The list of IFRS adopters and non-adopters is from Daske et al. (2008, pg. 1100-1102). The adoption date of IFRS for 
Singapore is 2003 and for all other countries is 2005. The sample period comprises of the four years before and five 
















Australia 2005 8 562 Argentina 9 573 
Austria 2005 9 1,924 Bermuda 8 79 
Belgium 2005 9 691 Brazil 9 1,329 
Czech Republic 2005 9 261 Canada 9 566 
Denmark 2005 9 1,034 Chile 9 282 
Finland 2005 9 210 China 9 723 
France 2005 9 3,904 Colombia 9 303 
Germany 2005 9 12,523 Egypt 9 278 
Greece 2005 9 284 India 9 823 
Hong Kong 2005 9 473 Indonesia 9 454 
Hungary 2005 9 309 Israel 9 190 
Ireland 2005 9 408 Japan 9 7,039 
Italy 2005 9 5,031 Malaysia 9 775 
Luxembourg 2005 9 885 Mexico 9 435 
Netherlands 2005 9 600 Morocco 9 166 
Norway 2005 9 1,120 New Zealand 8 131 
Philippines 2005 9 385 Pakistan 9 305 
Poland 2005 9 415 Peru 9 242 
Portugal 2005 9 412 Russia 9 2,297 
Singapore 2003 7 296 South Korea 9 400 
South Africa 2005 9 325 Sri Lanka 9 192 
Spain 2005 9 1,712 Thailand 9 401 
Sweden 2005 9 772 Turkey 9 520 
Switzerland 2005 9 3,571 U.S. 9 - 
U.K. 2005 9 2,385    
Venezuela 2005 6 169    
Total 
 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
The country-year sample in Panel A and the bank-year sample in Panel B cover 50 countries (26 adopters and 24 non-
adopters) and span the four years before and five years after IFRS adoption (which was 2003 for Singapore and 2005 
for all other countries). The year of adoption is excluded from both samples. CBFIN denotes cross-border financing 
defined as the ratio of foreign portfolio investment to total GDP. EQMKTCAP denotes domestic equity market cap 
scaled by annual GDP. TURNOVER denotes annual trading volume of all publicly traded stocks scaled by total shares 
outstanding. CBTRADE denotes cross-border trade and is defined as the ratio of imports plus exports to annual GDP. 
CONC indicates banking sector concentration and is defined as the percentage of the top five banks’ assets to total 
banking assets in the country. BNK_REL indicates banking sector reliance and is defined as the ratio of total private 
sector credit extended by domestic banks in the country to annual GDP. NIM denotes the net interest margin and is 
defined as the difference between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of total assets. RISK denotes 
bank risk-taking and is defined as the ratio of bank capital plus return on assets (ROA) scaled by the standard deviation 
of ROA. GROWTH indicates revenue growth and is defined as the percentage change in total revenues. LNASSETS 
represents bank size and is defined as the log of total bank assets (in USD millions). LIQUID denotes the ratio of 
liquid assets to liquid liabilities. LOANS is the ratio of bank loans to total assets. LISTED is an indicator variable that 
denotes public versus private banks. MKTSHARE denotes the bank’s share of the country’s total deposits. 
 
Panel A: Country level: 
 Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Country-level:       
CBFIN 442 2.126 0.449 7.711 0.009 48.386 
EQMKTCAP 442 0.793 0.566 0.738 0.051 4.714 
TURNOVER 442 0.777 0.637 0.638 0.008 3.373 
CBTRADE 442 0.704 0.530 0.593 0.184 3.474 
CONC (%) 428 68.988 70.890 18.750 28.012 100.000 
BNK_REL 427 0.929 0.943 0.567 0.110 2.179 
 
Panel B: Bank level: 
 Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Country-level:       
NIM (%) 53,640 2.104 1.830 1.571 -1.152 8.385 
RISK 59,164 3.617 3.619 1.256 0.664 6.659 
GROWTH  59,164 0.023 -0.019 0.339 -0.729 1.702 
LNASSETS 59,164 7.658 7.332 1.898 4.677 12.662 
LIQUID 59,164 0.316 0.202 0.34 0.008 1.857 
LOANS 58,364 0.559 0.596 0.232 0.002 0.964 
LISTED 59,164 0.168 0.000 0.374 0.000 1.000 
MKTSHARE  59,164 0.005 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.080 
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Table 3: Effect of IFRS adoption on cross-border financing (CBFIN) 
 
The dependent variable in Models (1) and (2) is cross-border financing (CBFIN), while that in Models (3) and (4) is 
cross-border trade (CBTRADE). POST is an indicator variable that takes 1 for the post-IFRS adoption period defined 
as the five years after IFRS adoption and 0 for the four years before adoption. IFRS is an indicator variable that denotes 
IFRS adopters versus non-adopters. GDP represents log GDP. GDPGROWTH and INFL represent the annual GDP 
growth and annual inflation respectively. All regressions include country fixed effects. In addition, Models (2) and (4) 
also include year fixed effects. Detailed definitions are in Table 2. 
 
 Cross-border Financing (CBFIN) 
Cross-border Trade 
(CBTRADE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
POST 0.079 <0.001 – – 0.029 <0.001 – – 
IFRS*POST 0.100 <0.001 0.099 <0.001 0.003 0.759 0.003 0.716 
Year effects No Yes No Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 





Table 4: Parallel trends and other sensitivity tests 
 
The dependent variable is cross-border financing (CBFIN). IFRS is an indicator variable that denotes IFRS adopters 
versus non-adopters. POST_-2 and POST_-1 are indicator variables that denote the two years before and one year 
before IFRS adoption respectively. POST is an indicator variable that denotes the post-IFRS adoption period. GDP 
represents log GDP. GDPGROWTH and INFL represent the annual GDP growth and annual inflation rates 
respectively. EQMKTCAP denotes domestic equity market cap scaled by annual GDP.  TURNOVER denotes annual 
trading volume of all publicly traded stocks scaled by total shares outstanding. CBTRADE denotes cross-border trade 
(i.e., imports and exports) scaled by annual GDP. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. Detailed 
definitions are in Table 2. 
 
 Cross-border Financing (CBFIN) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
IFRS*POST_-2 0.020 0.539 0.025 0.428 0.038 0.253 
IFRS*POST_-1 0.026 0.410 0.037 0.221 0.049 0.118 
IFRS*POST 0.111 <0.001 0.098 <0.001 0.118 <0.001 
GDP   -0.128 <0.001 -0.181 <0.001 
GDPGROWTH    -0.299 0.149 -0.247 0.168 
INFL   -0.040 0.701 -0.093 0.349 
EQMKTCAP     0.161 0.001 
TURNOVER     -0.052 0.144 
CBTRADE     -0.306 0.061 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 




Table 5: The role of country-level institutions  
 
The dependent variable is cross-border financing (CBFIN). IFRS_BNK_REL_HI (IFRS_BNK_REL_LO) denotes IFRS 
adopters with above (below) median banking sector financing (BNK_REL) in the pre-adoption period. POST is an 
indicator variable that denotes the post-IFRS adoption period. All regressions include the control variables of Model 
(3) of Table 4, and in addition country and year fixed effects. Detailed definitions are in Table 2. 
 
Panel A: Banking sector reliance 
 Cross-border Financing (CBFIN) 
 (1) (2) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
IFRS_BNK_REL_HI*POST    (1) 0.165 <0.001 0.151 <0.001 
IFRS_BNK_REL_LO*POST   (2) -0.010 0.485 -0.002 0.887 
p. value of (1) = (2) <0.001 <0.001 
Controls No Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.98 0.98 




Panel B: Enforcement  
 
The dependent variable is cross-border financing (CBFIN). Models (1) and (2) as well as (3) and (4) split the sample into European Union (EU) members and non-
members respectively. IFRS is an indicator variable that denotes IFRS adopters versus non-adopters. IFRS_BNK_REL_HI (IFRS_BNK_REL_LO) denotes IFRS 
adopters with above (below) median banking sector financing (BNK_REL) in the pre-adoption period. POST is an indicator variable that denotes the post-IFRS 
adoption period. All regressions include the control variables of Model (3) of Table 4, and in addition country and year fixed effects. Detailed definitions are in 
Table 2. 
 
 Cross-border Financing  (CBFIN) 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
IFRS*POST 0.419 <0.001 0.081 0.001     
IFRS_BNK_REL_HI*POST   (1)     0.299 0.001 0.129 <0.001 
IFRS_BNK_REL_LO*POST  (2)     0.161 0.138 -0.004 0.858 
p. value of (1) = (2)   0.006 0.001 









Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 




Table 6: Effect of IFRS adoption on bank competition 
The dependent variable in Models (1) and (2) is banking sector concentration (CONC), while that in Models (3) and (4) is net interest margin (NIM) defined as the 
difference between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of total assets. IFRS and POST denote IFRS adopters and the post adoption period 
respectively. IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI (IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO) denotes IFRS adopters with above (below) median increases in cross-border financing. GROWTH indicates 
revenue growth. LNASSETS represents the log of total bank assets. LIQUID denotes the ratio of liquid assets to liquid liabilities. LOANS is the ratio of bank loans 
to total assets. LISTED is an indicator variable that denotes public versus private banks. MKTSHARE denotes the bank’s market share of deposits. GDP represents 
log GDP. GDPGROWTH and INFL represent GDP growth and inflation respectively. EQMKTCAP denotes domestic equity market cap. TURNOVER denotes 
stock turnover. CBTRADE denotes cross-border trade. All regressions include country and year fixed effects. In addition, Models (3) and (4) cluster the standard 
errors by bank. Detailed definitions are in Table 2. 
 Bank concentration (CONC) Net Interest Margin (NIM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
IFRS*POST -4.469 0.002   -0.247 <0.001   
IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI*POST   (1)   -6.212 <0.001   -0.312 <0.001 
IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO*POST  (2)   -2.475 0.201   -0.153 0.073 
GROWTH      0.112 0.016 0.112 0.015 
LNASSETS     -0.215 <0.001 -0.215 <0.001 
LIQUID      -0.042 0.489 -0.038 0.526 
LOANS     1.276 <0.001 1.280 <0.001 
LISTED     0.163 <0.001 0.164 <0.001 
MKTSHARE      6.875 <0.001 6.839 <0.001 
GDP -2.264 0.516 -2.275 0.507 0.746 0.049 0.882 0.022 
GDPGROWTH  -1.099 0.937 -1.260 0.927 1.252 0.429 0.965 0.549 
INFL 21.262 0.108 21.211 0.100 3.042 0.011 3.267 0.007 
EQMKTCAP 0.136 0.967 0.718 0.835 0.054 0.852 0.121 0.680 
TURNOVER 8.550 0.001 8.606 0.001 -0.230 0.215 -0.206 0.235 
CBTRADE 7.543 0.545 7.845 0.541 0.589 0.299 0.288 0.595 
p. value of (1) = (2)  0.086  0.040 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.86 0.86 0.44 0.44 
Obs. 428 428 53,334 53,334 
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Table 7: Banks’ response to greater competition – higher risk-taking 
The dependent variable is bank risk-taking (RISK). IFRS is an indicator variable that denotes IFRS adopters. POST is 
an indicator variable that denotes the post-adoption period. IFRS_∆CONC_HI and IFRS_∆CONC_LO 
(IFRS_∆NIM_HI and IFRS_∆NIM_LO) denotes IFRS adopters with above versus below median increases in banking 
sector concentration (net interest margin) respectively. GROWTH indicates revenue growth. LNASSETS is the log of 
total bank assets. LIQUID denotes liquid assets scaled by liquid liabilities. LOANS is the ratio of loans to total assets. 
LISTED is an indicator variable that denotes public banks. MKTSHARE denotes the bank’s market share of deposits. 
GDP represents log GDP. GDPGROWTH and INFL represent GDP growth and inflation respectively. EQMKTCAP 
denotes domestic equity market cap. TURNOVER denotes stock turnover. CBTRADE denotes cross-border trade. All 
regressions include year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by bank. In addition, Models (1) and (2) 
include country fixed effects while Model (3) includes bank fixed effects. Detailed definitions are in Table 2. 
 Risk-taking (RISK) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
IFRS*POST -0.171 0.007     
IFRS_∆CONC_HI*POST   (1)   -0.103 0.156   
IFRS_∆CONC_LO*POST   (2)   -0.221 0.001   
IFRS_∆NIM_HI*POST      (3)     0.051 0.620 
IFRS_∆NIM_LO*POST     (4)     -0.193 0.018 
GROWTH  0.102 0.001 0.103 0.001 0.120 <0.001 
LNASSETS -0.044 <0.001 -0.044 <0.001 -0.191 <0.001 
LIQUID  -0.182 <0.001 -0.185 <0.001 0.068 0.014 
LOANS 0.785 <0.001 0.787 <0.001 0.564 <0.001 
LISTED 0.024 0.328 0.023 0.340 – – 
MKTSHARE  1.881 0.002 1.873 0.002 0.058 0.981 
GDP 1.152 <0.001 1.201 <0.001 1.271 <0.001 
GDPGROWTH  -0.769 0.301 -0.968 0.193 -0.308 0.702 
INFL -0.750 0.238 -0.650 0.298 -0.852 0.216 
EQMKTCAP 0.050 0.770 0.062 0.708 -0.062 0.779 
TURNOVER -0.209 0.085 -0.198 0.080 -0.250 0.081 
CBTRADE 1.160 0.003 0.955 0.010 0.517 0.311 
p. value of: (1) = (2) 
                   (3) = (4)  
0.021 
 <0.001 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes No 
Bank effects No No Yes 
Adj. R2 0.23 0.23 0.68 
Obs. 58,160 58,160 58,160 
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Table 8: Dynamic treatment effects 
 
The dependent variable is cross-border financing (CBFIN). IFRS is an indicator variable that denotes IFRS adopters 
versus non-adopters. POST_1 is an indicator variables that denotes the first year succeeding IFRS adoption while 
POST_2+ denotes the second year and subsequent years after adoption. GROWTH indicates revenue growth. 
LNASSETS is the log of total bank assets. LIQUID denotes liquid assets scaled by liquid liabilities. LOANS is the ratio 
of loans to total assets. LISTED is an indicator variable that denotes public banks. MKTSHARE denotes the bank’s 
market share of deposits. GDP represents log GDP. GDPGROWTH and INFL represent the annual GDP growth and 
annual inflation rates respectively. EQMKTCAP denotes domestic equity market cap scaled by annual GDP. 
TURNOVER denotes annual trading volume of all publicly traded stocks scaled by total shares outstanding. CBTRADE 
denotes cross-border trade (i.e., imports and exports) scaled by annual GDP. All regressions include country and year 
fixed effects. Models (2) and (3) cluster the standard errors by bank. Detailed definitions are in Table 2. 
 Cross-border financing (CBFIN) 




 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
IFRS*POST_1 0.112 <0.001 -0.238 0.008 0.061 0.382 
IFRS*POST_2+ 0.120 <0.001 -0.250 <0.001 -0.257 <0.001 
GROWTH    0.112 0.016 0.097 0.002 
LNASSETS   -0.215 <0.001 -0.043 <0.001 
LIQUID    -0.042 0.489 -0.182 <0.001 
LOANS   1.276 <0.001 0.785 <0.001 
LISTED   0.163 <0.001 0.024 0.323 
MKTSHARE    6.876 <0.001 1.900 0.002 
GDP -0.181 <0.001 0.742 0.047 1.050 <0.001 
GDPGROWTH  -0.243 0.177 1.247 0.431 -0.849 0.260 
INFL -0.093 0.346 3.043 0.011 -0.694 0.290 
EQMKTCAP 0.163 0.001 0.053 0.855 0.016 0.922 
TURNOVER -0.052 0.143 -0.232 0.205 -0.246 0.043 
CBTRADE -0.306 0.062 0.589 0.299 1.132 0.004 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.98 0.44 0.23 




Table 9: Sensitivity tests 
 
Panel A: Isolating demand versus supply effects 
 
The bank-level sample in this panel is restricted to private banks (i.e., those not publicly listed). The dependent variable is bank risk-taking (RISK). 
IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI (IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO) denotes IFRS adopters with above (below) median increases in cross-border financing. IFRS_∆CONC_HI and 
IFRS_∆CONC_LO denotes IFRS adopters with above versus below median increases in banking sector concentration. POST indicates the post adoption period. 
ACCTSTD is an indicator variable that denotes whether the private bank reports under Local GAAP or under IFRS. All regressions include the set of controls in 
Model (3) of Table 4, and in addition, year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by bank. Detailed definitions are in Table 2. 
 
 Net Interest Margin (NIM) Bank risk-taking (RISK) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
IFRS_∆CBFIN_HI*POST    (1) -0.278 <0.001 -0.278 <0.001     
IFRS_∆CBFIN_LO*POST   (2) -0.107 0.241 -0.107 0.275     
IFRS_∆CONC_HI*POST     (3)     -0.088 0.199 -0.085 0.218 
IFRS_∆CONC_LO*POST    (4)     -0.189 0.002 -0.166 0.012 
ACCTSTD   -0.001 0.995   -0.048 0.406 
p. value of:  
(1) = (2) 




 0.042 0.071 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.40 0.40 0.23 0.23 






Panel B: Public versus private firms 
 
This panel uses a subset of German banks with data on listing status of their syndicated loan borrowers on Dealscan. 
The dependent variable is bank risk-taking (RISK). POST is an indicator variable that denotes the post-IFRS adoption 
period. The POST indicator is split into two indicators – POST_PVT and POST_PUB that denote the post-IFRS 
adoption period for banks with above median lending concentration in private firms and public firms respectively. 
GROWTH represents annual growth in revenues. LNASSETS is the log of total bank assets. LIQUID indicates the ratio 
of liquid assets to liquid liabilities. LOANS is the ratio of loans to total assets. MKTSHARE denotes the market share 
of the country’s deposits.  
 
 RISK 
 (1) (2) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
POST -0.117 0.579   
POST_PVT   0.177 0.431 
POST_PUB   -0.564 0.034 
GROWTH  0.888 0.030 0.897 0.021 
LNASSETS -0.031 0.513 -0.019 0.647 
LIQUID  -1.228 0.035 -0.873 0.043 
LOANS -0.142 0.760 -0.128 0.721 
MKTSHARE  -43.764 0.013 -40.239 0.005 
p. value of diff.  <0.001 
Year effects No No 
Bank effects No No 
Adj. R2 0.25 0.28 
Obs. 252 252 
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Panel C: Clustering at the country-level 
 
The dependent variables are cross-border financing (CBFIN), banking sector concentration (CONC), net interest 
margin (NIM) and bank risk-taking (RISK) respectively. The country-level tests of Models (1) and (2) include all the 
country-level controls, while the bank-level specifications of Models (3) and (4) include all country-level and bank-
level controls. In addition, all specifications include year and country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered 














 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
IFRS*POST    0.094 0.015 -4.469 0.133 -0.246 0.007 -0.170 0.012 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.98 0.87 0.44 0.23 





Panel D: Are the results driven by the recent crisis? 
 
This panel presents factors that contributed to banks’ poor performance in the crisis. LEV denotes bank leverage, while 
DEPOSITS indicates the proportion of deposits to total assets. TIER1 indicates the tier 1 capital ratio, while 
FUND_FRAG denotes funding fragility, defined as the ratio of money market funding and inter-bank deposits to total 
funding. The values tabulated are for the pre-period (i.e., 2006).  
 
Differences in contributing factors: 
 LEV DEPOSITS TIER1 FUND_FRAG 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
IFRS = 1 88.606 91.791 67.239 74.331 14.608 10.761 38.024 31.532 
IFRS = 0 86.954 90.698 64.807 72.651 16.174 12.972 31.876 26.933 
p. value of 




Figure 1: IFRS adoption, cross-border financing (CBFIN), cross-border trade (CBTRADE)  
 
The horizontal axis denotes years relative to IFRS adoption. The vertical axis plots cross-border financing in Panel A, 
domestic equity market cap in Panel B and cross-border trade in Panel C.  
 
Panel A: Cross-border financing (CBFIN) 
 
 
Panel B: Cross-border trade (CBTRADE) around IFRS adoption 
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Figure 2: Differences in crisis-related factors between IFRS adopters and non-adopters 
 
The horizontal axis presents factors that contributed to banks’ poor performance in the crisis differentiated between 
IFRS adopters and non-adopters. LEV denotes bank leverage, while DEPOSITS indicates the proportion of deposits 
to total assets. TIER1 indicates the tier 1 capital ratio, while FUND_FRAG denotes funding fragility, defined as the 
ratio of money market funding and inter-bank deposits to total funding. The values tabulated are for the pre-crisis 
period (i.e., 2006).  
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